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The International Context of U.S.
Prison Reform
Using International Human Rights Laws
and Standards for U.S. Prison Reform
Alvin J. Bronstein*
Jenni Gainsborought
All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with hu-
manity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person. 1
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
[Nior cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.2
United States Constitution
Within the U.S. international human rights laws, stan-
dards and norms are generally regarded as a framework neces-
sary to constrain the behavior of other less compassionate, less
democratic nations. It is assumed that our own Constitution
and Bill of Rights, buttressed by strong and independent courts
to which all of us have access, guarantee us rights far beyond
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1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 10(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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those which any international body could confer.3 Yet the cur-
rent treatment of prisoners and the lack of tolerance for the
view that the Constitution should confer any rights on them at
all, argue that all is not well under our present system.
Litigation in federal courts, based on the Eighth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution, has had a profound impact on
the conditions in U.S. prisons in the past thirty years.4 Lawyers
who were active in the civil rights struggle of the 1960s had
learned to use the power and independence of the federal courts
to bring reform to state institutions. Having seen first-hand the
horrendous conditions in which their clients (and sometimes the
lawyers themselves) were housed in state prisons and local
jails, they understood that prisoners were the next powerless
segment of American society in need of federal protection. The
prisoner rebellion and its aftermath at Attica in 1971, in which
forty-three prisoners and guards lost their lives, served as an
opening into the dark world of America's prisons and became
the catalyst for the development of the modern prisoners' rights
movement. 5
The pioneering work of these early advocates of prisoners'
rights forced the courts to move away from the "hands off' doc-
trine under which they had declined to review prison conditions
or practices for many years. 6 Over the next twenty-five years,
3. See generally Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law & The
United States Double Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 365 (1998).
4. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316-29 (1972) (reviewing the
history and interpreting the meaning of the Eight Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)
(holding "that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners consti-
tutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,'.., proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment"); Hutto v. Finnely, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (finding that, "as a whole,"
the conditions in isolation cells violated the petitioner's Eighth Amendment
rights).
5. See generally N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON ATTICA, ArrICA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT
OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA (1972); see also LYNN S.
BRANHAM, THE LAW OF SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS' RIGHTS 337
(6th ed. 2002); Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965,
in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 169, 192- 93 (Norval Morris & David J.
Rothman eds., 1995).
6. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING
AND THE MODERN STATE: How THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998);
see alsoKenneth C. Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional Reform: An Analysis of
the Decline of the "Hands-Off' Doctrine, 1977 DETROIT C. L. REV. 795. The Su-
preme Court formally rejected the "hands off' doctrine in Wolf v. McDonnell, 418
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol24/iss2/20
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all areas of prison life were reformed as a result of lawsuits
brought by the American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU) Na-
tional Prison Project, by other non-profit litigating organiza-
tions and by individual attorneys. 7 But times changed.
More conservative courts, in particular a more conservative
Supreme Court, became less likely to find prison conditions un-
constitutional.8 Meanwhile, the increasing politicization of
crime led to calls not only for harsher punishments but also for
harsher conditions for those being punished.9 The "harsh on
prisoner" movement began a widespread attack on the very no-
tion of prison litigation, insisting that frivolous lawsuits were
tying up the courts and activist liberal federal judges were tying
the hands of prison administrators by micromanaging every
area of prison management through intrusive consent decrees.' 0
Stories of lawsuits over crunchy versus smooth peanut butter
and consent decrees requiring a specific cleaning agent to be
used were widely circulated as examples of these two trends."
The conflation of so-called "frivolous" lawsuits and the claims of
micromanagement by the federal courts implied that all prison
condition lawsuits were without merit, wasted tax payer money,
tied up the federal courts to the detriment of more worthy liti-
gation and undermined the move to harsher conditions of
confinement.
U.S. 539 (1974), finding that "[tihere is no iron curtain drawn between the Consti-
tution and the prisons of this country." Id. at 555-56.
7. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 6, at 366-69.
8. See id. at 47; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (finding that
"prison administrators... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adop-
tion and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to
preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security");
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 249 (1991) ("[O]nly those deprivations denying 'the mini-
mal civilized measure of life's necessities,' are sufficiently grave to form the basis
of an Eighth Amendment violation."); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)
(holding "extreme deprivations are required to make a condition-of-confinement
claim ... [and that b]ecause society does not expect that prisoners will have un-
qualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to
an Eighth Amendment violation only if those needs are 'serious' ").
9. See Susan Yoachum, Public, Politicians Agree: Get Tough on Felons, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 18, 1994, at Al.
10. See Naftali Bendavid, Putting Lawsuits in Lockdown: House Bill Curbs
Inmates' Legal Redress, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995, at 1; cf. Nat Hentoff, Con-
gress's Brutal Treatment of Prisoners, VILLAGE VOICE, Apr. 4, 1995, at 18.
11. See 141 CONG. REC. S14, 413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Robert Dole).
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This campaign of misinformation brought about the pas-
sage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) which severely
restricted prisoners' access to the courts and the powers of the
federal courts to ameliorate bad prison conditions. 12 This paper
does not discuss the consequences of that legislation which are
discussed in detail elsewhere. 13 Our purpose is to suggest an-
other approach to change the focus of litigation and of advocacy
on behalf of prisoners.
As a key advocate for human rights worldwide, the U.S. un-
questionably has a moral responsibility to accept as binding the
human rights standards by which we judge the conduct of other
states. The legal requirements imposed on the U.S. by interna-
tional human rights treaties are more ambiguous and currently
the subject of considerable debate.' 4 In some instances the U.S.
has signed but not ratified treaties. In others it has ratified
them but reserved the right not to implement certain key provi-
sions. The extent to which international law has been used in
U.S. courts and suggestions for its wider use are made below.
This paper is not intended to provide an exhaustive review of
those cases where international law has been used, nor to dis-
cuss all the ramifications of litigation using international law.
Both of those have been well documented by others and we pro-
vide some of those sources for lawyers wishing to pursue this
issue. 15 Rather we hope to provide an overview of the need for
and significance of international human rights in domestic
prison reform and encourage a debate on what the next steps
should be.
12. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1915,
1915A; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997h).
13. See, e.g., Randal S. Jeffrey, Restricting Prisoners' Equal Access to the Fed-
eral Courts: The Three Strikes Provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act and
Substantive Equal Protection, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 319 (2001); David M. Adlerstein, In
Need of Correction: The "Iron Triangle" of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2001); Thomas Julian Butler, The Prison Litigation Reform
Act: A Separation of Powers Dilemma, 50 ALA. L. REV. 585 (1999).
14. See generally Douglass Cassel, Does International Human Right Law
Make A Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 121 (2001); Jack Goldsmith, Should Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Trump U.S. Domestic Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 327
(2000).
15. See, e.g., FRANcisco FORREST MARTIN, CHALLENGING HuMAN RIGHTS VIO-
LATIONS: USING INTERNATIONAL LAw IN U.S. COURTS (2001) (focusing on U.S.
human rights violations).
[Vol. 24:811814
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The idea of using human rights law in prison reform is not
as far fetched as it might have seemed a few years ago. It is
certainly remarkable how the general debate on the use of in-
ternational human rights law has developed recently. Interest
in the issue can be seen at every level, from Supreme Court Jus-
tices to public interest law groups to individual practitioners.
For example, the American Civil Liberties Union held a meet-
ing in Atlanta, in October of 2003, to discuss the use of interna-
tional human rights law in litigation and advocacy. 16 The
meeting was attended by a number of individuals including
more than a hundred lawyers.
In the recently completed Supreme Court term, the opin-
ions in two important cases and the dissent in another invoked
legal principles from outside U.S. domestic law. 17
In one affirmative action case Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor wrote for a 5-4 majority that the University of Michi-
gan Law School's effort to enroll "a critical mass" of Black, La-
tino and Native American applicants could pass muster under
the U.S. Constitution. 8 Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate con-
curring opinion, joined by Justice Breyer, referencing the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, ratified by the U.S. in 1994.19 In addition, in
their dissent in the undergraduate affirmative action case, 20
Justices Ginsburg and Souter referenced "[ciontemporary
human rights documents" to distinguish measures designed to
promote racial equality from those designed to support racist
policies .21
Justice Anthony Kennedy buttressed his majority opinion
in the Texas sodomy case 22 by noting that the court's past ap-
proval of state sodomy bans was out of step with the law in
16. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Convenes First Na-
tional Conference on the Use of International Human Rights Law in the U.S. Jus-
tice System (Oct. 8, 2003), available at http'//www.aclu.org/International/
International.cfm?ID=13994&c=36.
17. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003); Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
18. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
19. Id. at 344.
20. Gratz, 539 U.S. 244.
21. Id. at 302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
22. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472.
815
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other Western democracies. 23 Citing opinions of the European
Court of Human Rights, he wrote that "[t]he right the petition-
ers seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part of
human freedom in many other countries." 24
In 2002 the Court's ruling banning the death penalty for
mentally retarded criminals also invoked international opin-
ion.25 In explaining why that practice violated contemporary
notions of permissible punishment, Justice John Paul Stevens,
writing for a 6-3 majority, said that "within the world commu-
nity, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed
by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disap-
proved."26
This is not only so in the U.S. Supreme Court. Perhaps
even more surprisingly, the Missouri Supreme Court, in its re-
cent finding that it is unconstitutional to execute someone for a
murder committed when under the age of eighteen, referred to
international laws and standards in reaching that decision. 27
The court noted that the views of the international community
have consistently grown in opposition to the death penalty for
juveniles. 28 The court references Article 37(a) of the United Na-
tions Convention on the Rights of the Child as prohibiting death
penalty for juveniles and noting that "several other interna-
tional treaties and agreements expressly prohibit the
practice."29
Indeed there is a good deal of activity in both litigation and
advocacy around the juvenile death penalty making use of in-
ternational law, as the U.S. is so clearly in defiance of all norms
and standards on this issue-we are now the only country that,
at least officially, still allows the death penalty for children.30 It
23. Id. at 2481.
24. Id. at 2483.
25. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
26. Id. at 316 n.21.
27. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003).
28. Id. at 410-11.
29. Id. at 411.
30. See AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-INDECENT AND INTERNA-
TIONALLY ILLEGAL: THE DEATH PENALTY AGAINST CHILD OFFENDERS (2002), availa-
ble at http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/reports/amr51-144-2002.pdf; see also
AMNESTY INT'L, CHILDREN AND THE DEATH PENALTY-ExEcUTIONS WORLDWIDE
SINCE 1990 (2002), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/reports/chil-
dren_and_dpsince1990.pdf.
[Vol. 24:811816
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does not seem far-fetched to expect that when the Supreme
Court next addresses the issue of executing juveniles, it will
find such a punishment to be unconstitutional and will buttress
that argument by reference to international laws and norms.
International human rights law provides another source of
law for prison litigators too. Although there are many impedi-
ments to its use, creative litigators are working to find ways
around these problems.
The main obstacle to successful use of conventional human
rights standards is that the U.S. has attached reservations to
treaties it has ratified, and has argued that such treaties are
not applicable unless Congress passes enabling legislation.
They are not self-executing and do not provide a private right of
action. Attorneys must therefore develop arguments to attack
the validity of U.S. reservations and the supposed non-self exe-
cuting status of the treaties.
An alternative approach would be to address the
supremacy of international treaties to state law. The practices
of U.S. states, rather than the federal government, are often
claimed to violate international human rights standards. Be-
cause international treaty obligations traditionally trump state
activities, practitioners may succeed in applying international
norms to state actions. Article VI of the Constitution, states "all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding. " 31
Using a federal statute provides a way around the problems
of attempting to litigate using international human rights law.
The Aliens Tort Claims Act (ATCA) is a federal statute that is
being increasingly used.32 The Act allows foreigners to bring
complaints of violations of the "laws of nations" to U.S. courts
for adjudication. In order for the court to establish that the
"laws of nations" have been violated, they are obliged to consult
the enabling statutes and decisions of human rights tribunals,
31. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, c. 2.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004).
817
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as well as international human rights covenants and
declarations .33
In New Jersey, Rutgers Law School International Law
clinic is using the Aliens Tort Claims Act to purse a case against
the INS and the private contractors who were running a deten-
tion center where the immigrants were subjected to brutal
treatment by the guards until eventually they rioted.34 Senior
Judge Dickinson R. Debevoise ruled that immigrants seeking
asylum can sue for damages over the abusive conditions of their
confinement. He dismissed one count of the suit against the
INS itself,35 brought under ATCA, allowing the plea of sover-
eign immunity, but he refused to dismiss the ATCA claim
against the individual INS officials sued, or against Esmor and
its employees.
Given the ever increasing number of immigrant detainees
now being confined, and the increasing number of non-U.S. citi-
zens being held in U.S. prisons and jails, there may be many
opportunities to make use of the Aliens Tort Claims Act on their
behalf. And that of course might put us in the interesting posi-
tion of requiring better conditions of confinement for immi-
grants than for our own citizens.
Clearly more work needs to done to develop arguments that
specific human rights treaties and standards are applicable to
U.S. law before we can hope to see the courts find international
law to be dispositive. More judicial education about those trea-
ties and standards will be required before judges are willing to
accept their use.
Attorneys may find courts more receptive to arguments
based on international human rights standards if they present
the standards first as useful interpretive aides. The courts
have for some time accepted that international standards can
offer us guidelines for the appropriate treatment of prisoners.
The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat-
ment of Prisoners 36 have been referenced in courts many times
33. See BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS (1996).
34. Jama v. I.N.S., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D. N.J. 1998).
35. The case against the INS is going forward on other theories of action.
36. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, E.S.C. Res.
633C (XXJV) U.N. ESCOR, Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611 (1950), U.N. ESCOR,
818 [Vol. 24:811
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over the years,37 although they are rarely seen in use in U.S.
prison administration.
The earliest reference by the Supreme Court to the applica-
bility of an international human rights instrument to a pris-
oner's case is in Estelle v. Gamble in 1976.38 In discussing
"evolving standards of decency," the Court listed the Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (SMRs) as one
of many proposed standards or model legislation that regulate
the standards of medical care provided to prisoners.
39
The court relied on the SMRs as an interpretive aid again
in Sterling v. Cupp.40 The court noted that federal standards
reflect principles found in nonofficial sources, such as the SMRs
and cited these sources "as contemporary expressions of the...
concern with minimizing needlessly . . . dehumanizing treat-
ment of prisoners .... ,,41
Similar cases come out of the lower courts too. In Lareau v.
Manson,42 the court uses the SMRs and other standards to de-
fine what constitutes prison overcrowding. 43 The court states
that the SMRs "may be significant as expressions of the obliga-
tions to the international community of the member states of
the United Nations."44 The court states that the SMRs and pro-
visions of the United Nations Charter are evidence of principles
of customary international law.45 The court also notes Connect-
icut's administrative adoption of the SMRs as well as federal
courts' use of the SMRs for guidance in particular cases.
46
Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076, (LXII),
U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977).
37. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Lareau v. Manson, 651
F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981); Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v. Mal-
colm, 520 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1975); Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162 (D. Mass.
2004).
38. 429 U.S. at 104-05 (holding "that deliberate indifference to serious medi-
cal needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,'
... proscribed by the Eighth Amendment").
39. Id. at 104 n.8.
40. 625 P.2d 123, 132 n.21 (Or. 1980) (holding that only guards of the same
sex may conduct a patdown or search of prisoners' anal-genital areas).
41. Id. at 131.
42. 507 F.Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980).
43. Id. at 1189.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
819
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In Bott v. DeLand,47 the court notes that the Utah's unnec-
essary abuse standard was based upon "internationally ac-
cepted standards of humane treatment," including various
human rights instruments. 48
While such references by the courts may not seem to be rev-
olutionary, there is no question that the acceptance of the SMRs
as a universal standard would be a major step in the acceptance
of human rights standards in prison administration. Penal Re-
form International uses the SMRs and other human rights
standards as the basis for prison staff training programs
throughout the world, and is currently working with the Ameri-
can Correctional Association to explore ways in which the SMRs
can become an accepted and integrated part of prison adminis-
trative policy and practice in the U.S.
The implication of these rules for prison policy and day-to-
day prison management has been explicitly laid out in Penal
Reform International's handbook Making Standards Work.49 In
2002, the International Centre for Prison Studies published A
Human Rights Approach to Prison Management: a Handbook
for Prison Staff,50 which relates the SMRs and all the other rele-
vant international human rights treaties and standards to the
work of prison staff in all areas including healthcare, discipli-
nary procedures, death row and the treatment of women
prisoners.
The treatment of women prisoners is one area where U.S.
practice clearly deviates from the SMRs and other human
rights standards. One creative litigator who is actively pursing
the international law option in prison conditions litigation is
Deborah LaBelle from Michigan. Her cases on behalf of women
prisoners subjected to sexual abuse by guards, in the Michigan
State Department of Corrections and in county jails, have been
47. 922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996), overruled by Spackman v. Bd. of Educ., 16 P.3d
2000 (Utah 2000).
48. Id. at 740 (referring, in a civil suit by a prisoner against prison officials, to
the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, and the SMRs).
49. PENAL REFORM INT'L, MAKING STANDARDS WORK: AN INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK ON GOOD PRISON PRACTICE (2d ed. 2001), available at www.
penalreform.org/english/MSW.pdf.
50. ANDREW COYLE, A HuMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO PRISON MANAGEMENT:
HANDBOOK FOR PRISON STAFF (2002).
820 [Vol. 24:811
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol24/iss2/20
20041 USING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 821
ground-breaking in many respects. 51 International standards
are quite clear, male guards should not be in charge of women
prisoners, and as part of the initial settlement in the prison case
it was agreed that the SMRs should be made available in the
prison library.52
The Michigan prison case is particularly interesting be-
cause it illustrates the benefits that can come from the synergy
between litigation and advocacy. Human Rights Watch's report
on the sexual abuse of women prisoners, All Too Familiar-Sex-
ual Abuse of Women in U.S. State Prisons,53 which looked at the
situation in Michigan, among other states, was released with
great publicity around the time of the trial and undoubtedly in-
fluenced the climate in which the case was heard.
Advocacy and public education are essential parts of the
process of change. Litigation using international human rights
law will certainly need the support of a program of public edu-
cation about the laws, their applicability and purpose. And the
introduction of human rights laws, standards and norms into
the language of advocacy can change the dialogue about prison
and prison reform in a way that is essential if we are to see
systemic change.
The PLRA and other anti-prisoner legislation passed at the
federal and state level have been successful and have provoked
little opposition, in part, because of the dehumanization of pris-
oners that has been part of the politicization of crime. It would
be difficult to exaggerate the extent of attempts to dehumanize
prisoners, to declare that all efforts at rehabilitation had been
proven useless, to insist that enforcing harsh conditions of con-
finement was the only way to control crime and reduce recidi-
vism. The reintroduction of chain gangs, of striped prison
51. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 123 (2003); Hadix v. Johnson, 228
F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2000); Nunn v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., No. 96-CV-71416-DT, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22970, 1997 WL 33559323 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 4, 1997).
52. See Nunn, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22970, 1997 WL 33559323. An article
for the HARVARD HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL, by Martin Geer, looks at the interesting
international aspects of this case and the whole area of women prisoners and
human rights. See Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and Wrongs in Our Own Backy-
ard: Incorporating International Human Rights Protections Under Domestic Civil
Rights Law-A Case Study of Women in United States Prisons, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 71 (2000).
53. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALL Too FAMILIAR-SExuAL ABUSE OF WOMEN IN
U.S. STATE PRISONS (1996), available at http://hrw.org/reports/1996[Usl.htm.
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uniforms and the reduction of opportunities for education and
recreation are among the examples of "punishing" conditions
imposed.54 Even levels of violence within prisons and brutal be-
havior by guards was viewed as acceptable and indeed de-
served. The kind of violent behavior that had brought some
prisoners long prison sentences was considered acceptable
when administered to them by the supposed agents of the law
who were guarding them. Meanwhile, any discussion of prison-
ers' "rights" was judged as support for criminal behavior and
damaging to the victims of crime.55
The language of human rights is important precisely be-
cause it speaks of universal rights-rights that belong to every-
one based on their humanity without regard to conduct or
status. Indeed all the major human rights documents make
specific reference to the rights of detained people. The Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights states in Article 5 that, "No
one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."5 6 The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Article 10, states, "All persons de-
prived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person."57 Similar
wording is included in the European Convention on Human
Rights, the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and
the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.58
54. See Rick Bragg, Chain Gangs Return To Roads of Alabama, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 1995, at A16 ("the sight of a man in chains would leave a lasting impres-
sion on young people," according to the state's Prison Commissioner); see also Kate
Stone Lombardi, Sing Sing Anecdotes Find a Chronicler, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22,
1998, at Cl ("the institution of striped prison uniforms . . . was meant both to
humble prisoners and make them easier to guard.").
55. See generally ROBERT JOHNSON, HARD TIME: UNDERSTANDING AND RE-
FORMING THE PRISON (3d. ed., 2002); MATTHEW SILBERMAN, A WORLD OF VIOLENCE:
CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA (1995).
56. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217A (III), U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
57. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 10(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
58. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, Nov. 5, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953);
African Charter on Human and People's Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (en-
tered into force Oct. 21, 1986); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
822 [Vol. 24:811
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As Vivien Stern argues in A Sin Against the Future: Impris-
onment in the World, it is not an accident that these key docu-
ments clearly include prisoners among those whose rights they
define.59 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was
drawn up in 1948 by the generation who had lived through the
Second World War and seen the worst that a state can inflict on
human beings in its power. They saw how the dehumanization
of particular groups-Jews, gypsies, homosexuals-and the
sanction of the state for their degradation and abuse could lead
to the institutionalized abuse of human rights. As a result, the
Charter of the United Nations, adopted in June 1945, reaf-
firmed a belief in "fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person.. . ,"60 The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights came three years later and was followed
by all the covenants and conventions on human rights that
make up the framework for how states of the world should treat
their citizens. Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights says, "No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment."61 As Vivien Stern
so eloquently expressed it,
Detained people are included because human rights extend to all
human beings. It is a basic tenet of international human rights
law that nothing can put a human being beyond the reach of cer-
tain human rights protections. Some people may be less deserv-
ing than others. Some may lose many of their rights through
having been imprisoned through proper and legal procedures.
But the basic rights to life, health, fairness and justice, humane
treatment, dignity and protection from ill treatment or torture re-
main. There is a minimum standard for the way a state treats
people, whoever they are. No one should fall below it.
62
The assertion of an inalienable right to human dignity
should form the basis for review of all prison conditions.
The first step in any widespread use of international
human rights in U.S. prison reform has to be a program of pub-
lic and judicial education. The "public" in this instance begins
59. VIVEN STERN, A SIN AGAINST THE FUTURE: IMPRISONMENT IN THE WORLD
191-224 (1998).
60. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
61. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 56.
62. STERN, supra note 59, at 192.
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with prison reform litigators and activists and prison adminis-
trators and then must include the media and the more general
public who need to be convinced that international human
rights law is not some alien, foreign entity but rather something
that shares, and indeed in many instances was built on, the
same language and values as our own Constitution and Bill of
Rights and was largely shaped with American involvement over
the years.
Law schools are increasingly offering international human
rights courses to their students. But judges who come from an
earlier generation of lawyers will also need, and in many in-
stances would welcome, education in the meaning and signifi-
cance of international law. 63
In the words of Mary Robinson, 64
[DIespite the progress that has been made in recent years in mov-
ing human rights to the center of the international agenda, the
reality is that they are still viewed by many merely as rhetoric
rather than legal realities which must be taken seriously. . . edu-
cation alone won't be enough. The human rights obligations of
states must be understood and taken seriously as legal
obligations. 65
This is at least as true for the U.S. as it is for any other
country. Prison conditions and the right of prisoners to decent
and human treatment would be an excellent place for us to
start.
63. A panel of judges at the First National Conference on the Use of Interna-
tional Human Rights Law in the U.S. Justice System, supra note 16, discussed this
issue at length and stressed that state judges in particular will tend to ignore is-
sues of international law raised in briefs presented to them simply because they do
not know anything about the laws.
64. Mary Robinson is a past president of the Republic of Ireland and was the
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights from 1997-2000.
65. Mary Robinson, Making Human Rights Matter: Eleanor Roosevelt's Time
Has Come, 16 HRv. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2002).
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